1       Daniel L. Balsam (State Bar No. 260423)         1       THE LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL BALSAM         2601C Blanding Avenue #271         3       Alameda, CA 94501         7       Tel: (415) 869-2873         6       Fax: (415) 869-2873         7       Jacob Harker (State Bar No. 261262)         1       Jacob Harker (State Bar No. 261262)         1       Jacob Harker (State Bar No. 261262)         2       LAW OFFICES OF JACOB HARKER         8       S2 Market Street, Suite 1007         8       San Francisco, CA 94104         9       Tel: (415) 624-7602         9       Fax: (415) 684-7757         10       Email: jacob@harkercounsel.com         11       Attorneys for Plaintiffs         12       Attorneys for Plaintiffs         13       SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA         14       COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (LIMITED JURISDICTION)         16       DEBRA KOTTONG, an individual; and       ) Case No.::       CGC = 17 = 556         18       Plaintiffs,       )       ComPLAINT FOR DAMAGES         19       v.       )       1.       VIOLATIONS OF CALIFOR         20       THE J.G. WENTWORTH COMPANY, a       CoMMERCIAL E-MAIL (CI
<ul> <li>MATOM FOSA INC., a Delaware ) corporation; )</li> <li>CABLE AUDIO/TIMEOUT PUBLISHING, a ) business entity of unknown organization; and ) DOES 1-1,000; )</li> <li>Defendants. )</li> <li>COME NOW PLAINTIFFS DEBRA KOTTONG and MARIA MARQUEZ and file th Complaint for one cause of action against Defendants THE J.G. WENTWORTH COM al and allege as follows:</li> </ul>
Complaint

#### I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT

1. Plaintiffs DEBRA KOTTONG and MARIA MARQUEZ bring this Action against professional spammers THE J.G. WENTWORTH COMPANY ("JGW") and its third party advertising networks and affiliates (aka "publishers"), including but not limited to DIVERSIFIED MERCURY COMMUNICATIONS LLC, MATOMY USA INC., and CABLE AUDIO/TIMEOUT PUBLISHING, for advertising in and sending at least 13 unlawful unsolicited commercial emails ("spams") to them. A representative sample appears on the next page (Figure 1).

2. Neither Plaintiff gave direct consent to receive commercial email advertisements from, or had a preexisting or current business relationship with, JGW – the entity advertised in the spams.

3. The spams all materially violated California Business & Professions Code § 17529.5 ("Section 17529.5") due to the use of third parties' domain names without permission and forged information contained in the email headers.

4. 14 JGW is strictly liable for advertising in spams sent by its third party marketing agents. 5. Spam recipients are not required to allege or prove reliance or actual damages to have 16 standing. See Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(A)(iii). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs did suffer damages by receiving the spams. See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(d), (e), (g), (h). 18 However, Plaintiffs elect to recover statutory damages only and forego recovery of any actual damages. See Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B).

6. This Court should award liquidated damages of \$1,000 per email as provided by Section 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii), and not consider any reduction in damages, because JGW and its marketing agents failed to implement reasonably effective systems to prevent advertising in unlawful spams. The unlawful elements of these spams represent willful acts of falsity and deception, rather than clerical errors.

7. This Court should award Plaintiffs their attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 17529.5(b)(1)(C). See also Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, providing for attorneys fees when private parties bear the costs of litigation that confers a benefit on a large class of persons; here, by reducing the amount of false and deceptive spam received by California residents.

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
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## II. PARTIES

# A. <u>Plaintiffs</u>

8. DEBRA KOTTONG ("KOTTONG") was domiciled in and a citizen of the State of California when she received the spams at issue. Ten of the spams at issue were sent to KOTTONG's email address *fadedjeens@yahoo.com* that she ordinarily accessed from California when she received the spams at issue.

9. MARIA MARQUEZ ("MARQUEZ") was domiciled in and a citizen of the State of California when she received the spams at issue. Three of the spams at issue were sent to MARQUEZ's email address *maria.marquez@mail.com* that she ordinarily accessed from California when she received the spams at issue.

B. Defendants

10. Plaintiffs are informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant THE J.G. WENTWORTH COMPANY ("JGW") is now, and was at all relevant times, a Delaware corporation with a primary place of business in Radnor, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that JGW does business as *peachtreefinancial.com* and *myjgwentworth.com* – the websites advertised in the 13 spams at issue.

11. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendant DIVERSIFIED
MERCURY COMMUNICATIONS LLC ("MERCURY") is now, and was at all relevant times,
a Delaware limited liability company with a primary place of business in New York, New York.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that MERCURY does business as
"Mercury Media" and *roia.biz*, and sent, conspired to send, assisted in the sending, and/or
contracted with others to send, all 13 spams at issue in this Action.

12. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendant MATOMY USA INC. ("MATOMY") is now, and was at all relevant times, a Delaware corporation with four offices in the United States, one of which is located in San Francisco, California. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that MATOMY sent, conspired to send, assisted in the sending, and/or contracted with others to send, 10 of the spams at issue in this Action to KOTTONG. More specifically, Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that MATOMY or its agents fabricated numerous nonexistent entities and claimed that these entities actually sent the spams. For example, the spam in *Figure 1* states at the bottom that it was sent by "Corpn Restudygroup, 2807 Allen Street, 354, Dallas, TX 75204." No such entity exists, and

the address is a box at a branch of The UPS Store. Nine other spams were supposedly sent by "Diasegmentation Jobs" in Natick, Massachusetts; "Know Autoworld" in Universal City, Texas; "Pixosite Lacorp" in Rio Rancho, New Mexico; and "Susauto Freshor" in Council Bluffs, Iowa. All of these nonexistent entities claim their addresses to be boxes at branches of The UPS Store or other commercial mail receiving agencies. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that an ordinary consumer cannot readily ascertain the identity of the true sender of the spams based on "Corpn Restudygroup" and the other nonsensical entities referenced in the spams.

13. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendant CABLE AUDIO/TIMEOUT PUBLISHING ("CABLE") is now, and was at all relevant times, a business entity of unknown organization with an unknown primary place of business. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that CABLE sent, conspired to send, assisted in the sending, and/or contracted with others to send, three of the spams at issue in this Action to MARQUEZ. More specifically, Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that CABLE or its agents fabricated numerous nonexistent entities and claimed that these entities actually sent the spams. MARQUEZ received two spams claiming that they were sent by "Cable Audio, 1077 Silas Deane Hwy #232, Wethersfield, Connecticut 06109 US," and one spam claiming that it was sent by "Timeout Publishing, 2018 Electric RD #275, Roanoke, VA 24018 United States." Both of these nonexistent entities claim their addresses to be boxes at branches of The UPS Store or other commercial mail receiving agencies. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that an ordinary consumer cannot readily ascertain the identity of the true sender of the spams based on these nonsensical entities referenced in the spams.

14. Plaintiffs do not know the true names or legal capacities of the Defendants designated herein as DOES 1 through 1,000, inclusive, and therefore sue said Defendants under the fictitious name of "DOE." Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE is legally responsible in some manner for the matters alleged in this Complaint, and is legally responsible in some manner for causing the injuries and damages of which Plaintiffs complain. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE Defendant was, at all times relevant to the matters alleged within this complaint, acting in conjunction with the named Defendants, whether as a director, officer, employee, agent, affiliate, customer, participant, or co-conspirator.

When the identities of DOE Defendants 1-1,000 are discovered, or otherwise made available, Plaintiffs will seek to amend this Complaint to allege their identity and involvement with particularity.

15. Defendants' joinder in this Action is proper pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 379 because Plaintiffs seek relief jointly and severally from Defendants arising form the same series of transactions and occurrences, and because common questions of law and fact as to Defendants will arise in the Action. The fact that all Defendants may not be implicated in all spams does not bar joinder: "It is not necessary that each defendant be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities." Code Civ. Proc. § 379.

## III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

## A. Jurisdiction is Proper in a California (Limited Jurisdiction) Superior Court

16. This California Superior Court has jurisdiction over the Action because at all relevant times, Plaintiffs and Defendant MATOMY were all located in California, and the amount in controversy at the time of filing is more than \$10,000 and less than \$25,000.

# B. <u>Venue is Proper in San Francisco County</u>

17. Venue is proper in San Francisco County because lead defendant JGW has not designated the location and address of a principal office in California or registered to do business in California with the California Secretary of State. *See Easton v. Superior Court of San Diego* (*Schneider Bros. Inc.*), 12 Cal. App. 3d 243, 246 (4th Dist. 1970).

18. Venue is also proper in San Francisco County because Defendant MATOMY is located in San Francisco County. *See* Code Civ. Proc. § 395.

## IV. THIRTEEN UNLAWFUL SPAMS

19. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in tortious conduct: "wrongful act[s] other than a breach of contract for which relief may be obtained in the form of damages or an injunction." *See* Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tort (last viewed Nov. 5, 2013).
20. California's False Advertising Law, Business & Professions Code § 17500 prohibits "not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which[,]

although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or

#### COMPLAINT

1 2	tendency to deceive or confuse the public." [T]he UCL and the false advertising law prohibit deceptive advertising even if it is not actually false.				
3	Chapman v. Skype Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 217, 226-27 (2d Dist. 2013) (citation omitted).				
4	A. <u>The Emails at Issue are "Spams"</u>				
5	21. The emails at issue are "commercial email advertisements" <sup>1</sup> because they were initiated				
6	for the purpose of advertising and promoting JGW's products and services.				
7	22. The emails are "unsolicited commercial email advertisements" <sup>2</sup> because neither Plaintiff				
8	gave "direct consent" <sup>3</sup> to, or had a "preexisting or current business relationship" <sup>4</sup> with, JGW –				
9	the advertiser in the spams.				
10	23. Plaintiffs did not consent or acquiesce to receive the spams at issue.				
11	24. Plaintiffs did not waive or release any rights or claims related to the spams at issue.				
12	25. Defendants JGW, MERCURY, MATOMY, and possibly DOES advertised in, sent,				
13	and/or conspired to send at least 10 unlawful spams advertising JGW that KOTTONG received				
14	at her "California email address" <sup>5</sup> from January 9-February 10, 2016.				
15					
16					
17	<sup>1</sup> "Commercial e-mail advertisement' means any electronic mail message initiated for the				
18	purpose of advertising or promoting the lease, sale, rental, gift offer, or other disposition of any property, goods, services, or extension of credit." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(c).				
19	<sup>2</sup> "Unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement' means a commercial e-mail advertisement sent				
20	to a recipient who meets both of the following criteria: (1) The recipient has not provided direct				
21	consent to receive advertisements from the advertiser. (2) The recipient does not have a preexisting or current business relationship, as defined in subdivision $(l)$ , with the advertiser				
22 23	promoting the lease, sale, rental, gift offer, or other disposition of any property, goods, services, or extension of credit." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(o).				
24	<sup>3</sup> "Direct consent' means that the recipient has expressly consented to receive e-mail				
25	advertisements from the advertiser, either in response to a clear and conspicuous request for the				
26	consent or at the recipient's own initiative." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(d) (emphasis added).				
27	<sup>4</sup> "Preexisting or current business relationship,' as used in connection with the sending of a				
28	commercial e-mail advertisement, means that the recipient has made an inquiry and has provided his or her e-mail address, or has made an application, purchase, or transaction, with or without				
29	consideration, regarding products or services offered by the advertiser. []" Bus. & Prof. Code				
30	§ 17529.1( <i>l</i> ).				
31	<sup>5</sup> "California e-mail address' means 1) An e-mail address furnished by an electronic mail service provider that sends bills for furnishing and maintaining that e-mail address to a mailing address				
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26. Defendants JGW, MERCURY, CABLE, and possibly DOES advertised in, sent, and/or conspired to send at least three unlawful spams advertising JGW that MARQUEZ received at her California email address on May 23, 2016.

Spam #	Recip ient	Date	From Name	Purported Sending Domain Name	Purported Sender
1	KOTT ONG	2016- 01-09	Peachtree Financial Solutions	toysrus.com	Corpn Restudygroup, Dallas TX
2	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-01	Peachtree Financial Solutions	ebates.com	Corpn Restudygroup, Dallas TX
3	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-05	**Peachtree_Fina ncial_Solutions**	longhornsteakh ouse.com	Pixosite Lacorp, Rio Rancho NM
4	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-06	Peachtree Financial *Solutions*	ebates.ca	Know Autoworld, Universal City, TX
5	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-06	Peachtree Financial *Solutions*	toysrus.com	Diasegmentation Jobs, Natick MA
6	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-06	-Peachtree Financial Solutions-*	toysrus.com	Diasegmentation Jobs, Natick MA
7	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-09	Peachtree Financial Solutions	toysrus.com	Susauto Freshor, Council Bluffs IA
8	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-09	Peachtree Financial Solutions	mcdonalds.com	Susauto Freshor, Council Bluffs IA
9	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-09	Peachtree Financial Solutions	burlingtonstores .com	Susauto Freshor, Council Bluffs IA
10	KOTT ONG	2016- 02-10	Peachtree Financial Solutions	toysrus.com	Susauto Freshor, Council Bluffs IA
11	MAR QUEZ	2016- 05-23	J.G. Wentworth	masnsports.com	Cable Audio, Wethersfield CT
12	MAR QUEZ	2016- 05-23	J.G. Wentworth	masnsports.com	Cable Audio, Wethersfield CT
13	MAR QUEZ	2016- 05-23	J.G. Wentworth	masnsports.com	Timeout Publishing, Roanoke VA

27. Details of the spams are as follows:

 28. The spams are all unlawful due to the use of third parties' domain names without permission and forged information in the email headers, as described in more detail below.

31 in this state; 2) An e-mail address ordinarily accessed from a computer located in this state; 3) An e-mail address furnished to a resident of this state." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(b).

29. Section 17529.5(a)(1) prohibits spams containing or accompanied by a third party's domain name without the permission of the third party.

30. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that all of the spams at issue in this Action contain third parties' domain names without permission of the third parties. Specifically:

31. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that third party Burlington Stores Inc. (Burlington, New Jersey) did not give permission for its domain name *burlingtonstores.com* to appear in or accompany one of the spams at issue in this Action.

32. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that third party Ebates Performance Marketing Inc. (Toronto, Ontario, Canada) did not give permission for its domain name *ebates.ca* to appear in or accompany one of the spams at issue in this Action.

33. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that third party Ebates Inc. (San Francisco, California) did not give permission for its domain name *ebates.com* to appear in or accompany one of the spams at issue in this Action.

34. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that third party Darden Restaurants Inc. (Orlando, Florida) did not give permission for its domain name *longhornsteakhouse.com* to appear in or accompany one of the spams at issue in this Action.

35. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that third party TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding LLP dba Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (Baltimore, Maryland) did not give permission for its domain name *masnsports.com* to appear in or accompany three of the spams at issue in this Action.

36. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that third party McDonald's Corporation (Oak Brook, Illinois) did not give permission for its domain name *mcdonalds.com* to appear in or accompany one of the spams at issue in this Action.

37. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that third parties Geoffrey LLC/Toys R Us Inc. (Wayne, New Jersey) did not give permission for their domain name *toysrus.com* to appear in or accompany five of the spams at issue in this Action.

38. Plaintiffs could see the third parties' domain names when they viewed the spams, as shown in *Figure 1*.

39. Such unauthorized use of third parties' domain names without permission is materially false and deceptive. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that JGW and/or its

marketing agents forged the Sender Email Addresses so that the advertisements would includedomain names belonging to legitimate third party businesses in order to:

- Falsely lend an air of legitimacy to the spams by leveraging the brand equity of legitimate advertisers, making the recipients believe that McDonalds, Toys R Us, etc. endorse JGW, and
- Trick spam filters as to the source of the spams. If JGW and its marketing agents used their *own* domain names, it would be more likely that spam filters would be able to automatically identify the domain names as being associated with spammers, and block the spams. On the other hand, emails purportedly sent by *mcdonalds.com*, *toysrus.com*, etc. are more likely to be treated as legitimate emails and not spams, and therefore not blocked.

40. Furthermore, assuming that these spams were *not* actually sent from the domain names that appear in the Sender Email Addresses, which Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege to be the case, then the spams also contained falsified and forged information, which violates Section 17529.5(a)(2).

# C. <u>Spams Sent From Domain Names Registered So As To Not Be Readily Traceable to the</u> <u>Sender Violate Business & Professions Code § 17529.5(a)(2)</u>

41. Section 17529.5(a)(2) prohibits falsified, misrepresented, or forged information contained in or accompanying in email headers.

42. A spam's headers are part of the email and part of the email advertisement.

43. "[H]eader information in a commercial e-mail is falsified or misrepresented for purposes of section 17529.5(a)(2) when it uses a sender domain name that *neither* identifies the actual sender on its face *nor* is readily traceable to the sender using a publicly available online database such as WHOIS." *Balsam v. Trancos Inc.*, 203 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1101 (1st Dist. 2012), *petition for review denied*, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 4979 (Cal. May 23, 2012), *petition for certiori denied*, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8423 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012), *petition for rehearing denied*, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 243 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2013). (emphasis in original).

44. All of the spams that Plaintiffs received advertising JGW were forged so that it *appears* that third parties – Burlington Stores, Mid-Atlantic Sports Network, etc. – sent the spams. The *purported* sending domain names did not identify any of the Defendants on their face, nor – since they belong to third parties – are the domain names readily traceable to the sender by

1	querying the Whois database, in violation of Section 17529.5. Balsam, 203 Cal. App. 4th at				
2	1097-1101.				
3	45. Plaintiffs could not identify the sender of any of the spams by querying the Whois				
4	database for the domain names (burlingtonstores.com, masnsports.com, etc.) purportedly used to				
5	send all of the spams at issue.				
6	D. JGW is Strictly Liable for Spams Sent By its Marketing Agents				
7	46. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that JGW contracted with third				
8	party advertising networks and affiliates, including but not limited to MERCURY, MATOMY,				
9	and CABLE, to advertise its websites <i>peachtreefinancial.com</i> and <i>myjgwentworth.com</i> via email				
10	for the purpose of selling products and services for a profit.				
11	47. No one forced JGW to outsource any of its advertising to spam networks and spammers.				
12	48. Advertisers are liable for advertising in spams, even if third parties hit the Send button.				
13	There is a need to regulate the advertisers who use spam, as well as the actual				
14	spammers because the actual spammers can be difficult to track down due to some return addresses that show up on the display as "unknown" and many others				
15	being obvious fakes and they are often located offshore.				
16	The true beneficiaries of spam are the advertisers who benefit from the marketing				
17	derived from the advertisements.				
18	Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(j)(k).				
19	It is unlawful [] to advertise in a commercial email advertisement [] under any of				
20	the following circumstances				
21	Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5 (emphasis added).				
22	49. In fact, in <i>Hypertouch Inc. v. ValueClick Inc. et al</i> , the court of appeal held that				
23	advertisers are <i>strictly liable</i> for advertising in false and deceptive spams, even if the spams were				
24	sent by third parties.				
25	[S]ection 17529.5 makes it unlawful for a person or entity "to advertise in a commercial e-mail advertisement" that contains any of the deceptive statements				
26	described in subdivisions $(a)(1)$ -(3). Thus, by its plain terms, the statute is not				
27	limited to entities that actually send or initiate a deceptive commercial e-mail, but applies more broadly to any entity that advertises in those e-mails.				
28					
29	Thus, like other California statutes prohibiting false or misleading business practices, the statute makes an entity <i>strictly liable</i> for advertising in a				
30	commercial e-mail that violates the substantive provisions described in section				
31	17529.5, subdivision (a) <i>regardless of whether the entity knew that such e-mails had been sent</i> or had any intent to deceive the recipient.				
	11				
	COMPLAINT				

192 Cal. App. 4th 805, 820-21 (2d Dist. 2011) (emphasis added). The court did not find that this was an arbitrary requirement; rather, the court identified sound policy reasons behind the Legislature's decision to create a strict liability statute. *Id.* at 829.

50. The advertising networks and affiliates who sent the spams, such as MERCURY,

MATOMY, and CABLE, are also liable for sending unlawful spams. *See Balsam*, generally.

# E. <u>Plaintiffs Sue for Statutory Liquidated Damages; No Proof of Reliance or Actual</u> <u>Damages is Necessary</u>

51. The California Legislature defined liquidated damages to be \$1,000 per spam. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii).

52. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the \$1,000 per spam figure is comparable with damages in other areas of consumer protection law, e.g., \$500-\$1,500 statutory damages per junk fax, pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 17538.43(b).

53. Plaintiffs' rightful and lawful demand for liquidated damages in the amount of \$1,000 per email is necessary to further the California Legislature's objective of protecting California residents from unlawful spam.

54. Section 17529.5 does not require Plaintiffs to quantify their actual damages, allege or prove reliance on the advertisements contained in the spams, or purchase the goods and services advertised in the spams. *Recipients* of unlawful spam have standing to sue and recover liquidated damages. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(A)(iii); *Hypertouch*, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 820, 822-23, 828.

55. However, Plaintiffs did suffer damages by receiving the unlawful spams advertising Defendant's products and services in the state of California, at their California email addresses. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(d), (e), (g), (h). Regardless, Plaintiffs do not seek actual damages in this Action, only liquidated damages. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B).

F. <u>Defendants' Actions Were Willful and Preclude any Reduction in Statutory Damages</u>
56. Section 17529.5 authorizes this Court to reduce the statutory damages to \$100 per spam.
But, to secure the reduction, Defendants have the burden of proof to demonstrate not only that *established* practices and procedures to prevent unlawful spamming, but also that they *implemented* those practices and procedures, and that the practices and procedures are *effective*.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(2).

57. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendants have not established and implemented, with due care, practices and procedures reasonably designed to

effectively prevent unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements that are in violation of
 Section 17529.5.

58. Even if Defendants had established any practices and procedures to prevent advertising in unlawful spam, such practices and procedures were not reasonably designed so as to be effective.
59. Even if Defendants reasonably designed practices and procedures to prevent advertising in unlawful spam, such practices and procedures were not implemented so as to be effective, as shown by the very existence of these spams.

60. Even *if* JGW had practices and procedures to prevent unlawful spamming, someone – the entity(-ies) who actually forged the spams' headers and included third parties' domain names such as *ebates.com* and *longhornsteakhouse.com* – certainly do not have such practices and procedures. Indeed, the senders' practices and procedures were designed precisely *to* violate Section 17529.5. Therefore, no reduction in statutory damages is available.

61. Emails do not forge their own headers to include unrelated third parties' domain names by themselves. The false and misrepresented information contained in and accompanying the email headers are not "clerical errors." Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendants intended to deceive spam recipients, Internet Service Providers, and spam filters by forging spam headers and including third parties' domain names without permission, and knowingly and willfully took steps to do exactly that.

62. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendants intended to profit, actually profited, and continue to profit, and were unjustly enriched by, their wrongful conduct as described herein.

## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### [Violations of California Restrictions on Unsolicited Commercial Email, California Business & Professions Code § 17529.5] (Against All Defendants)

63. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the foregoing paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.64. Plaintiffs received the spams at issue within one year prior to filing this Complaint.

65. Defendants advertised in, sent, and/or caused to be sent at least 10 spams to

KOTTONG's California email address and 3 spams to MARQUEZ's California email address

that contained third parties' domain names without permission and forged header information, in

1	violation of Section 17529.5. The unlawful elements of these spams represent willful acts of
2	material falsity and deception, rather than clerical errors.
3	66. The California Legislature set liquidated damages at One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000) per
4	email.
5	67. Defendants have not established and implemented, with due care, practices and
6	procedures to effectively prevent advertising in unlawful spams that violate Section 17529.5 that
7	would entitle them to a reduction in statutory damages.
8	68. Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of attorneys' fees and costs as authorized by Section
9	17529.5(b)(1)(C).
10	69. The attorneys' fees provision for a prevailing spam recipient is typical of consumer
11	protection statutes and supported by Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. By prosecuting this
12	action, Plaintiffs expect to enforce an important right affecting the public interest and thereby
13	confer a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons. The necessity and
14	financial burden of private enforcement is such as to make the award appropriate, and the
15	attorneys' fees should not, in the interest of justice, be paid out of the recovery of damages.
16	
17	WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants as hereinafter set forth.
18	
19	PRAYER FOR RELIEF
20	(Against All Defendants)
21	A. An Order from this Court declaring that Defendants violated California Business &
22	Professions Code § 17529.5 by advertising in and sending unlawful spams.
23	B. Liquidated damages against Defendants in the amount of \$1,000 for each of at least 13
24	unlawful spams, as authorized by Section 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii), for a total of at least
25	\$13,000 as set forth below:
26	• Liquidated damages jointly and severally against JGW, MERCURY, MATOMY, and
27	all DOE Defendants involved in sending spams to KOTTONG, in the amount of
28	\$1,000 per spam, or \$10,000.
29	• Liquidated damages jointly and severally against JGW, MERCURY, CABLE, and all
30	DOE Defendants involved in sending spams to MARQUEZ, in the amount of \$1,000
31	per spam, or \$3,000.
	14

1	C.	Attorneys' fees as authorized by Se	ction 17	529.5(b)(1)(C) and Code of Civil Procedure					
2		§ 1021.5 for violations of Section 1							
3	D.	Costs of suit.							
4	E.	Such other and further relief as the	Court de	eems proper.					
5									
6			THE	LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL BALSAM					
7				Daniel L Balsam					
8	Date:	January 9, 2017	BY:	Wanter & Justin C					
9				DANIEL BALSAM					
10				Attorneys for Plaintiffs					
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